tags: essay, philosophy
In Stevenson’s The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, he discusses the nature of “goodness” and what it means for any particular idea or “thing” to be good (p. 16). Specifically, Stevenson describes “goodness” to be “magnetic” – my belief in X to be good compels me to act in X’s favour. To further understand this concept, it is important to contextualize it with previous theories regarding goodness. To begin, one must understand the core idea(s) from which ethical questions arise: “Is X good?” or “Is this better than that?” Stevenson states that such questions are difficult to answer, and he elaborates, “we are asking, ‘Is there a needle in that haystack?’ without even knowing just what a needle is.’ To circumvent this issue, it is possible to distill the question into a clearer, less vague one (as not to completely change the initial question, of course). (p. 1). For example, the question “Is X good?” can be restated as “Does X do Y?” where Y is of relevance to the goodness of X. However, a paradoxical situation arises – the question seems to have become more vague! This stems from a further underlying issue: what is the definition of “good”?
There have been many different interpretations of the term “good” throughout philosophy and history. Stevenson describes two of these interpretations; Hobbes’ interpretation, “good is what is desired by me”; and Humes’ interpretation, “good is what is approved by moth people.” These interpretations may be called interest theories – “good” simply describes the current state of the speaker or majority’s wants (p. 15). For example, suppose that I were to say, “Stealing from me is not good.” According to interest theories, what I am saying may be substituted as, “I do not want you to steal from me,” or, “Society states that you must not steal from me.”
Stevenson presents “goodness” as being more than descriptive; “goodness” is emotive. To prove this, we may do further probing of interest theories. Suppose that person A and person B are debating the goodness of X. Person A says, “X is good.” Person B says, “X is not good.” The back and forth between persons A and B can be simplified to a conflict of interest; “I like X,” versus “I don’t like X.” According ot Hobbes’ interest theory, both of these people are correct in their statements – this does not make intuitive sense. This may be sensible in regards to small-scale issues, but as to larger, more directly opposing views, how can both person A and B be correct? To further exemplify the deeper unintuitiveness, we may look at Hume’s interpretation of goodness. Suppose that crowd A strongly votes in favor of some object, X. Despite the majority of people thinking in favor of X, person B has no reason to believe that X is good. For example, imagine the majority of a country being strongly in favour of a genocide – despite the consesus being largely in favor of genocide, you may think, “No, I do no think that is good.” (p. 17). Stevenson’s analysis of “good” draws much of its evidence in language – how are words used, and what exactly is the intent and meaning behind what someone says? What exactly is meant by “magnetism”?
When I say, “Stealing is not good,” what is my intent behind the statement? Stevenson states that there are two different purposes in our use of language – recording and communicating beliefs (descriptively) , and to vent emotion and incite action (emotively/dynamically) (p. 21). Magnetism draws from the second purpose; when I say, “Stealing is not good,” I am attempting to persuade the listener to share this belief. Suppose that I suggest, “Stealing from the rich is good.” Person B interjects, and says, “I don’t like it.” Despite being a perfectly valid response, it feels unnatural. The unnaturalness draws from the assumption that my statement was being used descriptively – B assumed that my statement meant, “We/I like stealing from the rich.” (p. 24). A more natural (and more apt) response would be something along the lins of, “Why?” or, “I disagree, here is why…” This form of response draws from the idea that what I had said was dynamic – I am trying to convince B of my statement’s superiority.
According to Stevenson, ethical terms are “instruments used in the complicated interplay and readjustment of human interests,” which can be seen through general observations (p. 20). It is well known that people have a tendency to separate into groups of similar interests, each group harboring their own moral perspectives. The people in these social strata are influenced by the greater social interpersonal interactions that they find themselves apart of. While the physical state a person may find themselves in will influence their beliefs and what they determine to be “good”, it would be disingenuine to assume that the words of others does not play a part in influencing a person’s ethical views. When those in power declare something to be “good”, their statement influences the beliefs of others If this ruler simply wanted to declare their opinion on something, what would be purpose of announcing it to the body they govern? The magnetism that “goodness” has plays an intrinsic part in the behaviour of people and their intentions. To further describe this phenomena, Stevenson writes, “When a person likes something, he is pleased when it prospers, and disappointed when it doesn’t. When a person morally approves of something, he experiences a rich feeling of security when it propsers, amd is indignant, or ‘shocked’ when it doesn’t.”
One glaring criticism of Stevenson’s analysis is that the question, “Is X good?” does not have the mere intent of influencing or asking for advice; while the answer will still influence the asker’s interests, this is solely due to the asker’s belief in X’s goodness to be driven by “truth,” where “truth” is reasoned deductively through learned the information learned through the answer (p. 30). Stevenson counters with the point that we cannot truly define what truth is when asking this question; we do not have a clear answer that we are looking for (“What does good mean in this context?”). This reflects the earlier points made of the vagueness of “goodness,” which then evolves into the idea of magnetism.
It is important to note Stevenon’s utilitarian description of “good.” Stevenson’s analysis is wholly detached from how ethical “should” be used and instead focuses on “why” they are used; Magnetism disregards the metaphysical idea of “goodness” being an innate feature, but instead that “goodness” is a method of spreading influence. To draw from one of his examples: A munition maker declares that war is a good thing. If the maker was merely describing his beliefs, he would not be insisting his opinion so strongly. Furthermore, if he was stating that the majority of people were in favour of war, not only would he be incorrect but he would be forced to prove it by the listeners. Instead, he is attempting to influence others in his beliefs, as proven by the numerous examples from earlier in this paper. Stevenson’s analysis does not attempt to claim that the maker’s use of “good” in and of itself, but his analysis is simply describing how it was being used. (p. 19-20).
Another key idea that Stevenson’s analysis ultimately proves is that no person is in a better position to make the claim “X is good” than another. As Stevenson has been discussing, the statement “X is good” is a “vehicle of suggestion.” (p. 30). By the very nature of this statement, Stevenson’s analysis of “good” prevents certain ethical statements to be more “correct” than others. Throughout this paper I have used examples in which you may have obvious or intuitive moralistic opinions on. However, your ethical claims in response to these examples, whether for or against, are not any more “correct” than the ethical statements that I have used for examples (assuming that “goodness” is not being used descriptively). Even here, good’s magnetism may be seen – the need to object and correct these examples is further proof that when the statement “X is good” is uttered, it is not being used as a mere description. The discourse that happens between two opposing ideas on the goodness of X, while it may contain certain descriptive elements, is ultimately a battle of suggestion rather than a battle of the scientific method. Intuitively we know this; an ethical debate is not held to describe our beliefs, but is used to persuade others into the same belief.
Stevenson, Charles Leslie (1937). The emotive meaning of ethical terms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.